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' I
AN ECONOMETRIC STUDY OF THE BRITISH
MONETARY SYSTEM*
This econometric study, involving quarterly data from 1962.1 to 1974.4
inclusive, tries to explain the British money stock and to shed general light on
the British monetary system. We shall treat money, bank loans, and privately
held government securities as simultaneously determined. Since we assume the
British monetary authorities to follow interest-rate objectives, we rule out any
treatment ofthe monetary base as exogenous, and therefore any exclusive focus
on the ratio of money to the base. But even though they pursue interest-rate
objectives, the British authorities are supposed to impinge on the stock of
money by affecting private choices between money and other financial assets.
The money stock therefore does not depend strictly on popular preferences
outside the banks and the authorities. Implicit in our treatment is an imperfect
world capital market; as otherwise any increase in the interest rate by the
monetary authorities would attract an indefinitely large demand for British
government securities, and any reduction in the rate by the authorities would
cause this demand completely to evaporate. In sum, we view the authorities,
the banks, and the private sector as interacting in the determination ofthe stock
of money.^
Since the model requires disequilibria in the stock of money to be resolved
partly outside domestic financial markets, a choice of an equilibrating variable
outside these markets is necessary. We make alternative use of official reserves
and the price level in this role. When using official reserves as such, the model
may be said to show how the British system works under full employment and
fixed exchange rates. When using the price level as such, the model may be
said to show how this system works under full employment and purely floating
exchange rates. Of course, the model was estimated during a period covering
both fixed and flexible, never purely floating, exchange rates, and occasionally
less than full employment. Therefore simultaneous-equation bias is possible.
But the only way to resolve this issue would be to enlarge the system and to
treat official foreign reserves, the price level, the foreign exchange rate and
output as simultaneously determined. Such an extension goes beyond our
present ambitions, especially since we have already had our hands full using
full information maximum likelihood in order to estimate a non-linear model,
* In preparing this work, we have benefited from the valuable help and advice of Charles Goodhart.
We have also obtained very useful editorial comments, especially from one ofthe econometrics editors,
and we are grateful to Pascal Mazodier, Michael Artis, William Branson, Mervyn King, and Lionel
Price. The editors would have liked us to experiment with other possible specifications, and provide
more tests and test statistics. The econometric work thus does not go as far as they would have wished.
' A similarly inspired, much more detailed econometric study of the British monetary system is
under way at the British Treasury, and Malcolm Knight and Clifford Wymer (1976) are evidently
engaged in a similar kind of effort.
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which we happen to use. Thus the only guide to the seriousness of simultaneous-
equation bias that we shall provide is the accuracy {or inaccuracy) of our
quarterly predictions for the two years immediately following the sample period,
1975 and 1976.
I. THE MODEL
Contrary to the case in many continental countries, the British government is
continually and heavily in debt to the banks. For all practical purposes,
British banks also have no discount facilities at the central bank and hold a
fixed ratio of legal reserves to deposits. Further, regulations do not permit the
British banks to take an uncovered position in a foreign currency, and therefore
to augment their domestic debt assets by borrowing abroad. As a result, these
banks have no immediate control over their total domestic assets. Their basic
policy variables are their interest rate on loans to private customers, and the
rate of services that they provide on their deposits (inclusive of interest). The
clearing banks did not even have as much latitude as this during much of our
study period (i.e. prior to Competition and Credit Control in May 1971). But
we view the banking system as going significantly beyond the clearing banks.
Let us begin the formal development with two accounting identities and two
definitions.^
PBR + F = B + G = B^ + B^ + G^ + G^ (i)
government accounting identity
p + NW, . . . • (2)
banking sector accounting identity
B^ + G^ + D-L _ (3)
definition of the net claims of the private sector against the
government and the banking sector
M = B^ + D ^ ' (4)
definition of money ,
Symbols: PER, public borrowing requirement; F, official foreign reserves;
B, monetary base; G, government securities; B^, monetary base held by the
banks; B^, monetary base held by the private sector; G ,^ government securities
held by the banks; Gp, government securities held by the private sector; Z.,
bank loans; 2), bank deposits; NW^,, net worth ofthe banks; iV(4 ,^, net claims of
the private sector against the government and the banking sector; M, money.
We shall treat the government sector as including the post office (now the
National Savings Bank, NSB) and the local authorities as well as the Bank of
England and the Treasury. There will be no formal distinction between the
Bank of England and the Treasury, though we shall refer to them separately.
The monetary base, B^ in the first accounting identity refers to all consolidated
' The best general guide to the British monetary system today is perhaps C. A. E. Goodhart (1973).
See also E.E.C. Monetary Committee (1974), Part three, 'Monetary instruments in the United King-
dom ' (which was prepared by the Bank of England); the special collection of articles from the Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin 1971-1975 ('975) dealing with Competition and Credit Control; the special
March 1973 issue of The Manchester School; and Donald Hodgman (1974), ch. 7.
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government liabilities except central government bonds and bills, or 'govern-
ment securities' in this last sense. Therefore the base includes the various forms
of national savings, giro accounts, deposits with the NSB, and local authorities'
liabilities, as well as bank reserves and currency. From the viewpoint of bank
behaviour, any infiow (outfiow) of claims into (out of) the banking system
against the NSB or the local authorities provokes the same asset expansion
(contraction) as an equivalent movement of currency. The previous definition
of the monetary base is therefore perfectly tenable, especially since the issue
of central bank control, as opposed to wider government control, over the base
is basically absent in this work.^
Equations (2) and (3) bring into focus the dividing line between banks and
the rest of the economy. (Equation (3) may be said to define the net claims of
the private sector against the government and banking sectors, and cannot be
represented as the financial balance sheet of the private sector, because the
equation excludes the foreign assets and liabilities ofthe private sector.) We shall
take two alternative views of this dividing line. According to the first and more
conventional one, the banking system includes only the London and Scottish
clearing banks, the Northern Irish banks, the discount houses, the merchant
banks, the overseas banks, and the officially listed 'other banks' (sec the Bank
of England, Statistical Abstract, 1975, no. 2, pp. 66-7). According to the second,
the banking system also includes the finance companies and the building
societies. This second view of the banking system obviously leads to broader
measures of L, D, Bf,, Gf,^ NW,,, and narrower measures of B^, G^ and NIV^^.
Accordingly, the second view implies a broader measure of money in equation
(4). Both views of money, in fact, are wider than the official M^. The narrower
one ofthe two, M^, equals M^ plus all national savings deposits and claims on
the local authorities. The wider one, Mg, includes the preceding M^ plus the
very large deposits with the building societies and the small deposits with the
finance companies (as well as a negative factor for consolidation).
In regard to the demand for money, M^ is more appropriate than A/3 since
the funds invested in national savings and with the local authorities are just as
liquid as the term deposits of a certain maturity with the commercial banks.
On this ground, however, A/5 is an even better measure than M^ since the
deposits with the building societies are also as liquid as the longer-term deposits
with commercial banks.^ But the Bank of England has never issued lending
requests of the same rigour to the building societies as to the commercial banks
* Much of the professional literature on the British monetary system, especially in the 1960s, was
concerned with the issue of potential central bank control over the monetary base (and thus involved a
narrow measure of the base). For a good indication of this general preoccupation, see the collected
reprints and bibliographical references in section in ('The Supply of Money') of H. G.Johnson and
associates, eds. (1972). Whatever the potential control over the base (however defined) may be, if the
base depends on market factors, then treating it as exogenous in econometric work is a mis-specification
and may lead to statistical bias.
* Afj, A/4 and M^ all include deposits of the Treasury with the commercial banks. This is objection-
able in analysing the demand for money in so far as these deposits reflect an accumulation of tax
receipts, but is not so in so far as the deposits reflect assets of the social security system and similar
governmental bodies. The latter organisatioas may manage their money assets much as many private
corporations do. Current statistics do not permit separating Treasury deposits into these two parts. We
shall therefore follow everyone else in leaving the issue pending.
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and has never required special deposits ofthe building societies and the finance
companies. Furthermore, these two sets of financial intermediaries hold a widely
different composition of assets from that ofthe commercial banks. On the latter
grounds, the supply of bank loans associated with M^ may be more stable and
more pertinent than the one associated with M^. It may be advisable then to
consider both M^ and A/5. There are thus four basic forms of the model in the
analysis, involving the cross-products of the money measures Af 4 and Af 5, and
the endogenous variables F and P.
Let us proceed next with the system of seven equations in Table i which
is the basis ofthe econometric analysis. The first of these equations, (5), con-
cerns the interest rate that the banks fix on their loans. This equation could be
alternatively expressed as determining the banks' desired ratio of loans to total
assets, L/{D + NWij). Viewed in this way, the equation would appear as a
supply of bank loans. In fact, the easiest way to check the theoretical signs of
the arguments in the equation (which we place above the variables) is first to
Table i
supply of bank loans
- + + + + - + +
I = g{i, i,, ',. •/> K CEIL, CCC, Y) (6)
demand for bank loans
+ - - + +
^ = A(', ^  CEIL, CCC, Y) (7)
deposits-to-money ratio
+ _ _ + +
M
-p = >(>„, «., >,. if, P., i, r, CEIL, CCC, Y) (8)
demand for money
+ + + - ±
~ = *{'„. >6, '"„ >, r, CEIL, CCC, Y) (9)
portfolio-demand for government securities
+ + +
desired interest-rate-spread ofthe authorities
G^= PBR^L-^F (11)
accounting identity of the consolidated government and banking sectors
Additional symbols: CCC, Competition and Credit Control; CEIL, direct credit controls; z, interest rate
on bank loans; :'(„ interest rate on private securities; i,, yield on equities; if, foreign interest rate;
I'l,, government bond rate; IR, government bill rate; P, price level; P^, anticipated inflation; r, reserve
requirement; Y, real income.
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analyse it with LI[D + NW,^) as the dependent variable. It then becomes evident,
after reverting back to the present form with i on the left, that L/{D + NlVi^)
theoretically has a positive sign, as do all of the other arguments except
Gompetition and Credit Control, CCC. This reform of May 1971 encouraged
banks to hold a higher ratio of private debts to total assets, therefore to charge
a lower interest rate on loans.^
In equation (6), or the demand for bank loans, the variable CEIL, reflecting
official restrictions on credit expansion, is a proxy for non-price credit rationing.
Further, the variable CCC appears in the equation because of the possibility
that this reform induced a fall in the price of bank loans that the other variables
there do not reflect.
The next three equations obtain after eliminating the service yield on bank
deposits as an explanatory variable, and are therefore partially reduced forms.
We conceive of this service yield as made up essentially of interest, liquidity,
and cancelled charges on services provided in executing orders, furnishing
records and information, etc. (The work of Benjamin Klein is relevant in this
regard.) Evidently we could have included an interest rate on savings deposits
as an important component of the service yield. But with jj^ and i both present
in the analysis in a critical way, and British institutional arrangements being
what they are (the correlation between these two rates in the study period is
o-gBg), we then foresaw an acute problem of multi-collinearity. Therefore we
simply postulate a positive infiuence of i (thus ;'„) on the service yield on
deposits generally without any attempt to treat the effect of i on the interest
rate on deposits separately. We also view the service yield on deposits as a
positive function of CCC (since the reform increased the competitive pressure
on the commercial banks) and a negative function ofr and CEIL. This is how
i, CCC, r and CEIL then enter into the analysis. This same treatment explains
why the former two variables, ? and CCC, theoretically increase the desired
deposit-to-money ratio (equation (7)}, raise the demand for money (equation
(8)) and lower the private sector's desired portfolio of government securities
relative to money (equation (9)), while the latter two variables, r and CEIL,
do the opposite.2
Real income in equation (7) refiects the possibility of different income-
elasticities of demand for bank deposits and other forms of money. Because of
the other measures of opportunity cost in equation (8), anticipated infiation
should be interpreted there strictly as a reflection of the opportunity cost of not
• There have been at least three excellent studies of the portfolio selection of particular agents in the
British monetary sector: Frank Brechling and George Clayton (1965); Michael Parkin (1970); and
W. R. White (1972).
' Of course, lhe relation of J to the service yield on deposits varied during the study period; and in
particular, the rate on certificates of deposits rose above i during a time in 1973-4 (thereby making it
temporarily profitable to borrow in order to hold CDs). In so far as a general movement of 1 relative
to the service yield on deposits was involved in these movements, this must be reflected in our treatment
of the variables rCC and CEIL; otherwise we do not take account of it. It may also be observed that,
contrary to possible impression, the service yield on bank deposits could not be considered as exogenous
before May 1971 when the interest rate on deposits with the clearing banks was rigidly tied to Bank
Rate. Not only is our concept ofthis yield too broad to permit such a view, but our analysis concerns
the yield on the deposits of the entire banking sector, not only the clearing banks.
1979] STUDY OF THE BRITISH MONETARY SYSTEM 879
consuming. On similar grounds, anticipated inflation has no place in equations
(7) and (9), which deal with desired composition of financial assets. No wealth
restraint ties together the demand for money, the demand for bank loans, and
the private demand for government securities because the demand for net
foreign assets of the private sector is absent in the analysis and therefore serves
as a residual (the foreign interest rate being explicitly present in these equations,
of course, however)."^
With regard to equation (lo), requiring more discussion than the rest, first
we must go back one step and explain the use of two prices of government
securities; ig, a bond rate, and i^, a bill rate. Based on our model, f^  matters
to the banks while the bond rate matters to the private sector. The importance
of iji to the banks reflects two aspects of British institutional arrangements;
first, the fact that the discount houses guarantee the sale of all new issues of
bills at the bill rate desired by the Bank of England, and second, the fact that
the interest rate that the banks charge on advances and the interest rate that
they pay on deposits are both very closely related to Bank Rate, thus bill rate.
This last implicit relationship to bill rate may have been greater before CCC, but
has remained important since. (Bank Rate is obviously not distinguished from
bill rate in the model.) On the other hand, the private sector is much more
sensitive to the yield on long-term government securities than to bill rate.
We assume, generally, that the government chooses to control both prices
of government securities, ig and i^^ (this assumption obviously involving some
simplification in the case of i j . Equation (io) consequently stipulates that
the authorities maintain a certain relationship between the two rates, varying
the difference between the two on the basis of anticipated inflation [P^) and
the foreign interest rate (i/). More speciflcally, the authorities supposedly let
ig rise relative to i^ as Pa ^ "^ V S^ ^P- Why would the government behave in
this way?
The British banks absorb a lot of national debt at levels of ij^ which if also
applicable to ig would induce the private sector to absorb practically no
government securities, or would provide no such inducement to the private
sector unless there was a general anticipation of a fall in interest rates. This
leads the government to keep ig above ij^ in order to reconcile low interest
' If we hold income and the demand for goods and services constant, the wealth constraint in the
private sector may be written as
i-B-E)-L]^ = o
where A[ ]d meanK a 'desired variation', NFA is the value of net foreign assets, B and E relate to
private bond and equity assets respectively, and ( — B~E) is the sum of private (inclusive or corporate)
liabilities to the private sector. B+ E and {~B~E) must be shown separately, as above, even though
B — B and E — E equal zero since an excess demand (or supply) of B and E in the private sector is
obvioiisly not a violation of Walras' Law. The system thus lends itself to a reasonable reduced-form
equation for desired net foreign assets of the form:
4. +
NFA = m{if, i, („ .„ P^, Y)P.
Without a series for NFA, it is impossible to provide an R* relating to this value in our work, and our
estimates can provide at best - that is, if we make the appropriate auxiliary assumptions - the errors
in the implicit estimates of NFA.
29-a
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charges on a portion ofthe national debt with adequate inducement to ordinary
firms and households to hold government securities. The same desire to reconcile
these two objectives explains the government's willingness to let ig rise relative
to iji as antieipated inflation and the foreign interest rate go up. Implicit in
this formulation, of course, is some basic concern of the authorities with the
monetary base and therefore the quantity of money; for the only possible
objection that the authorities could have to low private inducements to hold
government securities is that the Bank of England then would be compelled
to buy more of these securities, thus raising the base and money.
Accounting identity (ii) obtains simply by sunnming up equations (i) and
(2). This identity necessitates measuring government securities at book value
instead of market value even though market value is preferable in analysing
the demand for government securities. Another drawback of the identity is that
the net worth of the banks, NWf,, then becomes essential in the analysis. This
second drawback, however, is mitigated by the fact that on either of our two
measures of the banking sector (associated with M^ or Afg), NWf, is dominated
by a regular upward trend, except for 1971 when a forward leap in the NWf,
series took place, whieh is, however, reflected in CGG.
The following general picture ofthe model then emerges, which in describing
we shall consider at first for the case where F is endogenous. The banks set the
interest rate on their loans and the private sector determines the level of these
loans at given commodity prices. In the same way, the government sets the
prices of government securities, while the private sector determines how large
a ratio of these securities to money to hold. Once bank loans and the ratio of
private holdings of government securities to money are known, then, based on
additional (exogenously given) knowledge ofthe public borrowing requirement,
official reserves, and the net worth of the banks, an accounting identity deter-
mines the stock of money. Further, the public's desired ratio of bank deposits
to money determines bank deposits. (The accounting identity (2) would also
yield Bf, + Gf, in case this were wished to be known.) The values of bank deposits
and bank loans together imply a particular ratio of deposits to loans. This ratio
then has a reciprocal effect upon the interest rate that the banks wish to set on
loans, which means that the system is not recursive (as it might seem otherwise
from this description). To be specific, if L/Z) is higher than the banks wish,
they raise /, thereby discouraging the demand for loans and encouraging the
demand for their deposits (mostly via a higher interest rate to their depositors),
and inversely. Finally, the demand for money serves to determine the price level,
thereby affecting all ofthe nominal values in the system. The seven endogenous
variables corresponding to equations (5) to (r i) are then i, L, ig, Gp, A/, D and F.
The two central links between public, bank and private behaviour are evidently
the interest rate ; and the price level. Since these two values are simultaneously
determined with the rest, all of the endogenous terms are interdependent.
In the case where F is exogenous but F endogenous, the only basic changes are
that the demand for money serves to determine M and the accounting identity
(11) to determine F. Since F does not enter in any of the behavioural equations,
i is then the only central link between equations.
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It may be observed that the supply of money and the supply of bank loans
both lend themselves to a statement in terms of the product of a multiplicand
('base') and a multiplier. But the multiplicand ('base') in this case must be
properly understood as the sum of the public borrowing requirement and
official reserves. Let d equal D/M, g equal G^JM, I equal LjD and NW,^ be
zero. Then after some rearrangement of equation ( i i ) , we have
M =
therefore M = r-.-
i+g-ld
and L i+g-ld
If we view F as an exogenous variable, this system has a very conventional
aspect. An increase in the demand for loans raises both multipliers whereas
a rise in i^ and ig reduces them.^ The authorities therefore can alter the stock
of money at any given PBR, that is, independently of fiscal policy. In fact, the
higher the negative impact of i^ and ig on both multipliers, the more independent
monetary policy is from fiscal policy, since the monetary impact of a rise in
PBR then can be more easily offset through increases in ijf and ig. Even apart
from any changes in ij^ and ig, the authorities can exercise monetary restraint
through official restrictions on loan expansion, since r and CEIL also have a
negative effect on both multipliers. (Note that the influence of a rise in r or
CEIL on the multipliers depends largely on the dampening effect of r or CEIL
on bank incentives to attract depositors, without which either instrument would
act on Id only by lowering /.)
On the other hand, in the event that Fis endogenous, as under fixed exchange
rates, the system has an unconventional aspect since increases in ij^ and i^
then can theoretically raise F enough to offset the fall in the money multiplier,
thus raising M. This possibility of a rise in M is explained by the possible
increase in the demand for real money balances stemming from the associated
rise in the yield on bank deposits. Any rise in desired real money balances
when F is endogenous implies a rise in money (since P then is exogenous),
hence implies a rise in F which more than offsets the fall in the money multiplier.^
' Further, a rise in the demand for bank loans raises Id, thus raising the loan-multiplier more than
the money-multiplier, and a rise in in and ig lowers Id, thus lowering the loan-multiplier more than
the money multiplier. C. A. E. Goodhart (1973), pp. 479-83, 4go, questions the necessary negative
effect ofa rise in bill rate on bank loans and money. He points to the positive impact of bill rate on the
yield on bank deposits, which in turn increases D, thus lowers g. However, the rise ia the yield on D
also accentuates the fall in Id, thereby contributing to the fall ip both multipliers. In terms of equation
(11) we can see that lfPBR + Fis fixed, a positive effect of bill rate on M requires a larger reduction in
Gp than L. This condition seems too strenuous to hold, especially when we consider that the concomitant
rise in !„ mitigates the fall in Gj,. Goodhart's point would be more reasonable, of course, in the case ofa
rise in IR without any change in ig. Cf. Brechling and Clayton (1965). pp. 307-14.
' A similar rise in bank loans is impossible because the induced rise in i must lower the demand for
real loans. Conformably, as footnote i above says, the loan-multiplier necessarily falb more than the
money-multiplier.
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Of course, demand for real money balances need not rise with the rise in iji
and ig since the increase in ig tends to lower this demand. But in the British
example where the interest rate on deposits is highly sensitive to Bank Rate,
the positive effect of the yield on bank deposits on the demand may prevail.
Thus, the traditional method of tightening money - raising Bank Rate - may
have the opposite effect of raising it.
Viewing matters in real terms but retaining the simplifying assumption of
NWf, = o, it makes no difference whether For P is endogenous since neutrality
conditions are satisfied. There is no money illusion; anticipated inflation is
independent ofthe price level; and the ratio of official reserves to the public
borrowing requirement has no effect on any real value (basically because the
supply of bank loans is independent of this ratio). Hence real money, real loans,
privately held real government securities (and interest rates) are the same
whether F or P is endogenous; only nominal values are affected. Furthermore,
monetary policy (changes in ijj, ig, r and CEIL] can affect real values, but
fiscal policy (changes in PBR) cannot.
Stated differently, the system could be viewed as one of seven equations in the
seven unknowns i, L/P, D/M, M/P, GJM, ig and {PBR + F)/P. It is only by
virtue of the treatment of PBR and F or PBR and P as exogenous tliat we obtain
the nominal values in the system.
II. STATISTICAL MEASURES AND THE ESTIMATED FORM OF
THE SYSTEM
Virtually all of the financial data necessary to test the model are available on
a quarterly basis since 1963 in the Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, the
Bank of England, Statistical Abstract (no. 1, 1970; and no. 2, 1975), and the
Central Statistical Office {C.S.O.), Financial Statistics. Many of the series in these
sources are first-differences from one end-of-quarter to the next. But this never
produced a difficulty, since we were always able to find an appropriate stock-
level at a relevant point in time in order to convert first-differences into stocks.
Much to our advantage, the publications of the Bank of England explicitly
use the identity APBR + AF=AGp + A(Gf, + B^)+^Bj, in reporting. Note that
APBR-j- AF'in our treatment corresponds to the 'public borrowing requirement'
of the statistical sources. What we term AFBR therefore is this 'public borrow-
ing requirement' minus the change in official reserves. In order to derive the
stock series for PBR + F we used a report of the outstanding public debt (for
one calendar date) found in the March 1973 issue of the Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin. Regarding AF, we used the column 'total official financing"
ofthe table 'balance of payments' ofthe Quarterly Bulletin. Once we knew
PBR + F and AF, we encountered no need for a separate stock figure for F
for any purpose in the econometric analysis (compare note i on p. 888 below).
In regard to commercial bank statistics, we calculated NWf, in exact con-
formity with equation (2), that is, by finding L + Bf^ — D. Sterling loans to
foreigners and sterling deposits held by foreigners are retained in our series for
L and D. The passage from Af 4 to M^ was done on the basis of balance-sheet
information concerning finance houses and building societies in the G.S.O.,
1979] STUDY OF THE BRITISH MONETARY SYSTEM 883
Financial Statistics (tables 66, 68 and 69 of recent issues) .^  The data for quarterly
real income (GDP at factor cost: expenditure side) and the price level (the
implicit price of GDP, 1970 = 100) come from the G.S.O., Economic Trends.
Our stock series are end-of-quarter, but we used quarterly averages for
interest rates. We measured i^ as the rate of discount on allotments for 91-day
bills at the weekly tender. To measure ig, we first experimented with the rate
on 21 % consols, but eventually decided in favour ofthe rate on 5-year govern-
ment securities.^ On the critical issue of the measure of i - the marginal cost
of bank loans-we needed an interest rate series reflecting variable market
conditions for bank loans outside the cartelised clearing banks, especially
during the period prior to CCC. Our two basic choices were the interest rate
of the local authorities on temporary loans and the discount market's buying
rate on three-month traded private bills. After wide experiments, we selected
the latter. With regard to the private bond rate, i^, we used the redemption yield
on 20-year debenture and loan stocks. Our series for i^ is the ratio of corporate
earnings to the price of equities, or the so-called earnings yield on shares.
Finally, in the case of z^ , we used the sum of (i) the interest rate on three-month
Eurodollar deposits in London, and (2) the three-month forward premium on
the dollar in London.^
As to the measure of anticipated inflation, we experimented with the Parkin—
Sumner-Ward (1976) quarterly time series resting on a sophisticated use of
information drawn from questionnaires.^ (The particular Parkin-Sumner-Ward
series that we used concerns the anticipated rate of growth of retail prices.)
But this series gave much less satisfaction than a naive distributed-Iag of past
rates of inflation based on the formula
where F is the price of GDP. The one-period lag in this formula is useful in
permitting a treatment of P^ as a predetermined variable in the case where P
(therefore P) is endogenous. In applying this formula, we went back in time
with the series for observed infiation until going back any further no longer
affected /*„ during the sample period. This meant going back ten years.
Our measure of r is the ratio ofthe sum of vault cash and bank deposits at
the Bank of England to bank deposits. While automatically incorporating
special deposits, this measure has the drawback of also including the ratio of
' Specifically, first we added alt sterling loans by these two sets of institutions to L and deducted all
sterling loan liabilities cf these institutions lo the listed banks from L\ second we added all of the credits
of these institutions to tbe government to Gf, and deducted the same value from Gj,\ third we added all
of the deposit liabilities of these institutions to D and subtracted their deposit assets with the listed
banks from Z); similarly fourth we deducted their deposit assets with the government sector from B^;
and finally we recalculated NWf, based oa the same principle as previously.
* Our use ofthe accounting value of 0'^  may have something to do with the better performance of
the 5-year rate than the coiisol rate, since changes in the 5-year rate induce smaller capital gains and
losses, therefore render the accounting nneasure of C^ , more adequate.
' Michael Hamburger (1977) makes a case for neglecting the forward premium in analysing the
British demand for money.
* See also the subsequent work of J. A. Carlson and Parkin (1975).
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excess legal reserves. However, this ratio is very small and any effort to eliminate
it (never attempted thus far) would have no mentionable effect on the series
for r. CCC is a dummy variable. As regards CEIL, we used the Artis-Meadows
(n.d.) index of direct controls on bank lending, which ranks the intensity of
controls on a 0-1-2 scale on the basis of the lending requests of the Bank of
England.^
Our early estimates ofthe theoretical equations (5) to (9) necessitated several
modifications before passing to the final estimation forms. First, a problem of
multi-colHnearity confronted us because of the multiplicity of interest rates in
the analysis. Consequently, we removed i^ and i,, everywhere. We were also
unable to distinguish either the negative influence of ig from the positive
influence of; in the demand for money (8), or the negative influence of / from
the positive influence oft,, in the portfolio demand for government securities (9).
Both variables entered positively in both equations. Theoretical considerations
then led us to remove ig from equation (8) and / from equation (9). We also
dropped r everywhere, since this variable underwent no major change during
the estimation period except for one important fall coinciding with Gompetition
and Credit Control. Accordingly, r was completely dominated by CCC in the
analysis. Similarly, we did not retain CEIL in the supply equation (5), where
it was insignificant. Since CEIL is highly significant in the demand for loans (as
well as equations (7), (8) and (9)), at least in the case of Mj, there is evidence
of credit rationing. Hence, it is not surprising that CEIL would not enter
significantly on the supply side: if credit controls yield credit rationing, they
cannot have much effect on the interest rate i (though the controls then might
still exercise an important infiuence in equations (7), (8) and (9) via the impact
they may have on the service yield on deposits). We added seasonal dummy
variables in the demand for bank loans and the demand for money [X^^ X^^ X^
standing for the first, second and third quarter respectively).
With regard to the timing of infiuences, distributed lags were included
everywhere except equations (5) and (10), dealing with the behaviour ofthe
banks and the authorities respectively. Theoretical considerations argue for a
long adaptation process in the demand for bank loans. After many trials we
selected a 12-quarter Almon lag polynomial ofthe second degree in this demand
equation. As concerns equations (7), (8) and (9), where shorter lags seem
appropriate, we experimented with varying lengths and forms of lags, but
eventually settled in favour of a simple hypothesis of a four-quarter linear
decay in the infiuence of all the explanatory variables except one: i^ in equation
(9) .2 In this last case, we estimated the influence with the same r 2-quarter Almon
lag as in the demand for bank loans. As a general qualification, however, we
uniformly assumed a linearly declining, four-quarter effect ofthe introduction
of CCC and an unlagged influence of CEIL.
^ The Artis-Meadows index is not published in tlie memo (n.d.), but has circulated widely.
R. F. G. Alford (1972) has constructed a similar index before.
' In his study ofthe quarterly demand for money in Grral Britain, involving strictly My, Hamburger
('977} reports good results without any lagged adjustment. Thereby he goes counler to the rest ofthe
literature on this demand, even as regards A/,, where his position is theoretically most persuasive. For
references to this literature, see Hamburger (1977) and Graham Hacche (1974).
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m. THE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
According to the model, if NWf, is zero, no structural parameter depends upon
the choice of F OT F as endogenous: only the nominal values are affected.
Consequently, the use of a method of estimation involving direct estimation of
the structural equations, such as full information maximum likelihood (FIML)
as opposed to two-stage least squares (which involves the reduced form), v '^ould
guarantee that the estimates of the structural equations would be independent
ofthe choice of/* or F as endogenous. In this work we use FIML. Consequently,
had NWf, been zero in equation (5), our parametric estimates would have been
independent ofthe choice of P or i^  as endogenous.
In fact, however, the presence o[ NW^ really makes little difference since NWf,
enters only in the ratio L/{D + NWf,) of equation (5). If we express this ratio as
L/D
i+NWJD
we can see that the term NWf^/D in this last expression must depend on the use
of P or F as endogenous, since NW,, is the same in both cases, whereas D
necessarily depends on the estimate of P if P is endogenous but not otherwise,
or if F is so. Yet the subsequent differences in the estimates of L/{D + NWf,]
cannot be great in the two cases, as they depend on the differences in the
estimates of D, the impact of these differences on NWf,/D and the consequent
effect on L/{D + NWf,) (where NWt,/D is only about 15 % of {D + NWf,)/D for
Afj or A/5). In fact, none of the parameter estimates of equation (5) differ by
more than 4 % depending on whether P OT F serves as endogenous. Further,
there are no noticeable changes in the estimates of the structural parameters
of any other equation depending on this choice of F or F. Hence, with the
possible exception of equation (5), we have only one set of parameter estimates
to report for either one of our two measures of money.
If we think in terms of the structural estimates, there is thus little to dis-
tinguish our system from a more general one, to which we have already alluded,
in which the endogenous term would be considered {FBR + F)/P instead of P
or F. As regards the reduced form of the system, however, our interpretation
ofthe model as involving POT F as endogenous has much practical econometric
significance. If i^is endogenous, the relevant series for P in the reduced-form
equations is the observed one, whereas if P is endogenous, this series for P is the
fitted one. Thus the estimates, the R^s, and the standard errors ofthe estimates
of the nominal values of L, D, M and Gp will differ, possibly a lot, with F or F
as endogenous. Furthermore, major differences can arise in our post-sample
predictions depending on this choice of P OT F as endogenous. From a theor-
etical perspective, it should be added that the basis for interpreting P or F, but
not {PBR + F)/P, as endogenous is clear.
The FIML estimates with M4 and M^ are shown in Tables 2 and 3, where
we include the estimates of equation (5) based on F as endogenous. The ones
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based on P as endogenous are given by footnote below.^ As the notation indicates
the ratio terms L/P, DjM, G^jM and LI{D-\'NW^ are expressed logarith-
mically. This enables us to linearise all of the terms except LI[D-^NW^). The
accounting identity is also non-linear with respect to the logarithms of M, Gp
and L. These two non-linear aspects are then the reason why we resorted to a
non-linear method of calculating the FIML estimates. But though this involved
an enormous amount of time and trouble, only moderate importance can be
attached to it in the end, since the FIML estimates based on a linear approxi-
mation to the model are very similar. The computer program used for the
FIML estimates of the non-linear model is Clifford Wymer's ASIMUL.
The R^s and ps (coefficients of autocorrelation in the residuals) at the bottom
of both tables are the basic ones in the analysis, not those at the right of each
equation. The latter R% and ps pertain to the individual equation alone, and
were constructed on the basis of the FIML estimates of the parameters, but the
observed, as opposed to the fitted, values of the explanatory variables (Including
the observed values of the denominators of the dependent variables on the left
in equations (6), (7), (8) and (9)). The fundamental interest of these last R^s
and ps then lies in the comparison they provide with the essential ones at the
bottom of the table.
The parameter estimates in Tables 2 and 3 refer to cumulative influences.
Where these estimates involve Almon lags with a second-order polynomial -
or in the case of i, if, P^, and In Y in equation (6) and ig in equation (9) - we
provide the time-distributions of the influences. Otherwise, the time profiles of
the distributed lags are always the same: 0-40 of the total influence at time t,
0-30 at time ^+1, 0-20 at / + 2 and o-io at /-t-3 (see earHer discussion, last
paragraph of section n). The numbers in parentheses below the coefficients
are ratios of the estimates of the coefficients to the estimates of the asymptotic
standard errors. They are not Student fs; let us call them U values'.
The bill rate, ij^, evidently does not completely dominate the econometric
analysis in equation (5), as we might have feared. Despite the great significance
of iji in this equation, L/{D + NW,,) and CCG both enter significantly and with
the right sign.
In equation (6), or the demand for bank loans, the positive effect of real
income is only clear when loans from building societies and finance companies
are included, or in the case of Afg. But in this case, the estimate of the income-
elasticity of the demand for loans seems much too high. Also, CEIL is important
only in the case of M^, that is, when the narrower measure of bank loans is
^ They are: /,
(M4} t = 3-78 -1-4-71 In -I- i-o5i'n- O-74CCC
(4-64) (3-28) ^ ^ + ^ " ' . (32.,) (3.,6)
R* = 0-985 p = 0-17
(MJi = 3-21 + 4-92 In + I o6i'n-0-50CCC
(4-49) (3-24) ^ + ^ ^ ' (33-7) (2-66}
R« = 0-985 p = 019
It is important to see that from an econometric standpoint, the case where F h endogenous is indis-
tinguishable from thr one where PB/?-*-/*'is considered as such. PBR and F enter strictly in the account-
ing identity and in the same way. Thus, if any tlieoretical case can be made for treating PBR+F as the
adjustment factor instead of/^ , all of the results with Fas endogenous can be applied to PBA-f F.
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involved. This would indicate that the past lending requests of the Bank of
England largely shifted lending from the banks toward the building societies,
as is plausible since the building societies (though not necessarily the finance
companies) have been subject to less stringent lending requests than the
commercial banks (Artis and Meadows, n.d.; Alford, 1972). The time-profile
of the impact of i and if in equation (6) is also quite sensible. However,
those of Iny, and in the case of M^, P,^ are not. In the latter instances, the in-
fiuence continues rising for three years before stopping abruptly. Despite
numerous experiments, we were unable to remedy the aforementioned defects
of the estimates of this demand equation.
The estimates of equation (7), the desired deposits-to-money ratio, are quite
good in the ease of A/4, but less so in the case of A/5, where i, CEIL and CCC are
insignificant. We generally find the influences of these last three variables to be
smaller in the case of M5, or when building societies and finance companies are
included as banks. It should be observed that the coefficients of autocorrelation
in the residuals of the estimates of Z) are too high.
In the demand-for-money equation (8), the impact of anticipated inflation
in Great Britain clearly comes to light, perhaps for the first time. We are
generally successful in obtaining significant and opposite-sign coefficients of
if, /•„ and i in the demand for money and the demand for loans. Similarly CEIL
properly discourages both bank borrowing and money-holding, whereas CCC
encourages both of them.^ The only basic failure of the econometric analysis
in regard to equation (8) is our aforementioned inability to display the negative
influence of the interest rate on government securities, ig.
We encountered speeial difficulty with the portfolio-demand for government
securities. This is evident in our abandonment of all interest rate terms except
the own-rate, ig. The failure to find a negative coefficient of i is particularly
regrettable since the variable performs very well in equations (6) and (8), and also
in the case of A/4, equation (7). In addition, the time-profile of the estimated
influence of ig in equation (9} is unsatisfactory. This influence steadily rises
until the end. The fault may lie in the use of the accounting rather than the
market value of Gp. To explain, a rise in ig reduces the market, not the account-
ing value, ofa government security. Hence, following such a rise, the account-
ing value of Gj, is too high relative to the appropriate value, and this excess in
value fades with time as the market price of the security converges toward
maturity value. The result is to produce unduly low coefficients at first. This
may then largely explain the rising time-profile in our estimates. (The same
use of the accounting value of G^  could underlie some of our other difficulties
with interest rate variables in this equation.)"
' On the issue of CEIL, note the interesting work on credit rationing of P. D. Spencer (1975) at the
British Treasury (of which we have seen only memos thus far). Our estimates of the eff'ect of CCC on the
demand for money corroborates the general view in Great Britain ofa 'shift' in the demand for money
in 1971. Our interpretation of the role of CCC in explaining this 'shift' also agrees particularly well
with the views of the research staff of the Bank of England. See Hacche (1974). In addition, our results
are compatible with the view of Michael Artis and M. K. Lewis (1976) that an important element
in this 'shift' may be simultaneous-equation bias in single-equation estimates of the demand for money.
' Mervyn King has pointed out to us that the failure to take into account the taxation of interest
income may be another reason for these difficulties with the interest rate variables.
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Equation (10) conforms to our hypotheses about government behaviour.
It may be noted, quite generally, that if/* is endogenous instead off, the R^
for Gp is notably higher and the R^s for Z,, D and M are somewhat lower. With
either P or F as endogenous, the model with M^ also involves substantially less
autocorrelation in the residuals than the one with M^.
Tables 4 and 5 concern the respective reduced forms with F and P as endo-
genous. In both cases, the tables provide the cumulative impacts of changes in
the exogenous variables.^ In Table 4, where/^ is endogenous, the first numerical
column confirms the earlier theoretical possibility that a rise in ij^, while
lowering L, would raise M. The estimates of this rise in M might even seem
exaggerated by our omission of the restraining, negative effect of i^ on the
demand for money. However, this is debatable since the coefficient of i in the
demand for money should reflect the combined influence of i and i^ , since
multi-collinearity between the two rates is the reason why we removed ig from
the equation in the first place. Accordingly, we would argue that the coefficient
of i in the demand for money is already mitigated by the negative effect of ig.
Similarly, we would argue that the restraining effect of the missing variable i
in the portfolio-demand for government securities is implicit in the coefficient
of the coUinear variable ig. The impact ofa rise in z^  in this column in jointly
raising A/, Gj, and implicitly G(, (as the banks reduce their loans in favour of
government securities), is made possible by the inflow of official reserves.
The next two columns show the impact of respective percentage-point rises in
if and /*„. The results conform generally to expectations: deposits, money
and official reserves fall, but the private sector borrows more from the British
banks. Of course, both of these columns are strongly conditioned by the
assumption that the authorities keep ij{ the same. This last assumption is
especially important in explaining the moderation of the rise in i and ig.
It is not surprising to find in the next column that a i % rise in real income
has much greater impact on M and L in the case of M^ than Af 4, as the co-
efficients of In Y in the demand for loans and the demand for money are much
larger in the case of M5 than M^. What is surprising, however, is the negative
impact of In Y on official reserves. The literature on the monetary approach has
conditioned us to expect the opposite, positive sign. But it must be remembered
that in this particular application of the monetary approach, the authorities
follow an interest-rate objective. Therefore the positive influence of Y^ on the
demand for loans bears repercussions on the domestic source component of the
supply of money (or PBR-^L — Gp — NW^. As this demand for loans rises, the
banks expand their loans at the expense of government securities. The private
sector similarly tries to sell government securities (In F reducing GpjM enough
to offset the rise in G^ which is associated with the increase in the demand for
money). The excess supply of government securities thus resulting is necessarily
purchased by the authorities in order to prevent i^ and ig from rising, which
* In order to construct these table.s, we first calculated by hand the cumulative-impact (or steady
state) coefficients of the reduced form as algebraic functions of the parameters, doing so by linearising
the system. Wymer's computer program then did the rest, furnishing the numerical values of the
coefficients and the ( values. (The program supplies / values for any functions of the parameters.)
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in turn leads to an increase in the domestic source component of the money
supply (of the exact value of the rise in L — Gp). The outcome is a fall in F, since
the increase in this last source component is even larger than the rise in the
demand for money. It may be seen that ultimately the fall in F can be traced
mainly to the much higher coefficient of In Y in the demand for loans than the
demand for money. Since the estimate of the income-elasticity of the demand
for loans may be considered excessive, there Is therefore a doubt about the
negative impact of Y on F. Also no weight at all should be attached to the
sizeably higher estimate of the fall in F in the case of A/g than Af 4. Whereas
exogenous disturbances can have different quantitative effects on L, D, M and
Gp depending on the measure of money, since different measures of these vari-
ables are involved, the effects on ;', ig., Fand P theoretically must be independent
of the money measure.
The P column derives from the neutrality conditions. The next column,
relating to CCC, confirms the general impression that this once-and-for-all
reform had colossal effects, both on the domestic source component of the
supply of Mi and on the demand for M^. Similarly, the reform had much
smaller but nevertheless substantial effects on both the domestic source com-
ponent of supply and the demand for A/5. These effects on supply and demand
are nearly matching in both cases, and therefore the influence on official reserves
is ambiguous, though tending to be positive. If anything, then, the reform was
deflationary. The numbers in the CEIL column may seem quite arbitrary at
first, but are really fairly meaningful, since the passage from zero to unity on the
Artis-Meadows scale is equivalent to the use ofa dummy variable to describe
an event. The main arbitrary element in the scale is probably the assumption
that the credit restraint involved in passing from zero to one is equivalent
to the one involved in passing from one to two. Thus we may reasonably
conclude from this column that credit controls are a much weaker instrument
than bill rate. In so far as such controls play a role (that is, particularly in the
case of AfJ, they have the advantage over the bill rate of limiting loans and
raising official reserves without encouraging money in the case ofa fixed exchange
system (when F is endogenous).
The coefficients in Table 5 are derivable from those in the previous table.
The effects on i and ig in both tables are necessarily almost identical because
of the near-neutrality conditions. The key to the other coefficients in Table 5
lies in the last value in the P column of Table 4. This value says that an
exogenous rise in PBR + F of 0-345 billion pounds would lead all nominal
values to rise by i %. If so, at a given level of commodity prices and official
reserves, any excess demand for real money balances that can be resolved by
raising F by one billion pounds can equally be resolved by lowering P by
(1000/345)% or 2-9%. Multiplying the coefficients of the F row of Table 4
by — 2'9 then yields the corresponding coefficients of the P row of Table 5.
Once we know this P row, the L, D, M and G^  rows follow because LjP, DjP,
MjP and G^fP in both tables are the same. The only genuinely new information
in Table 5 therefore concerns the t values.
Note the occasional differences in signs regarding the same nominal variables
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in Tables 4 and 5, as for example with respect to the influence of i^, if and
P^^ on D and M. These opposite signs, of course, highlight the importance of the
exchange rate regime. Table 4 relating to fixed rates and Table 5 to flexible
rates. The estimates therefore show, in accordance with theory, that the two
basic monetary instruments, i^ and CEIL, have a much stronger quantitative
impact on deposits and money under flexible rates, and that i^ and /*„ have a
much stronger effect on deposits and money under fixed rates. A change in real
income alters nominal variables much more under flexible than under fixed
rates.
Table 6 bears on the predictive accuracy of the model in 1975-6, or during
the eight quarters immediately following the sample period.^ It provides us
our single most important means of choosing between the model with F or P
as endogenous. Post-sample simulations were performed with M^ and Af 5 and
either one of these two as endogenous.^ We find that the model always overshoots
i and ig. In fact, in the case of M5 with P as endogenous, the model overshoots
every endogenous variable. On the other hand, with M^ and F as endogenous,
or Mi and either F or P as endogenous, the predictive accuracy of the model
is reasonable. Indeed, the average percentage errors in predicting D, M and
Gp are within 2 to 3-3 % in the case of the combinations M^-P and M^-F. Thus
the predictive tests do not permit a clear choice between POT Fas endogenous.
These tests do, however, reinforce the previous conclusion (largely based on the
coefficients of autocorrelation in the residuals in Tables Q and 3) that the model
performs better with M^ than A/g. The M^ model clearly predicts L and i better
than the M^ one, most likely because of the excessive income-elasticity of the
demand for loans (13-38) in the case of M^ (3*74 in the case of Af^).
Finally, with the use of either Af 4 or Af 5 and P or F as endogenous - or in all
cases - the model is not particularly effective in predicting F or P, the two
variables to which we pay least attention in the theoretical analysis. As a matter
of practical judgment, in looking for improvements we would be prone to
analyse oflicial reserves and the price level simultaneously. We would be
similarly prone to refine the reaction function of the authorities. These two
modifications go hand in hand.
Institiit National de la Statistique et JACQ,UES MELITZ
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